The 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit was held in Tianjin, China from August 31 to September 1, 2025. Coming at a major historical juncture, this summit arguably grabbed the global limelight more than ever before, bringing together the main non-Western powers and emphasizing their commitment to establishing a “more just, equitable and representative multipolar world order“.
The SCO is the world’s largest contiguous regional bloc by population and land area. Preceded by the Shanghai Five in 1996, as a Central Asian regional cooperation forum, the SCO today covers 24% of the world’s total area, 42% of the human population and 36% of the world’s total GDP, on a Purchasing Power Parity basis (23% in nominal terms). This is primarily due to the membership of the large economies of China, India and Russia rather than increased integration among smaller states.
In his official address, this year’s SCO host, President Xi Jinping of China, unveiled his country’s fourth major global initiative – the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), which follows the Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (2023). The Global Governance Initiative encompasses five core principles – Sovereign Equality, International Rule of Law, Multilateralism through the UN System, People-Centred Approach and Real Actions.
Evolution and leadership
In the early 1990s, post the collapse of the USSR, Russia and China were weaker economies compared to today, and suspicious of the US-led unipolar world. Their 1997 Joint Declaration established fundamental principles that are still reflected in the 2025 Tianjin declaration. The 1997 declaration focused primarily on establishing “a new international order” through regional cooperation and strengthening the United Nations. While it already called for a “multipolar world”, the mechanisms for achieving it remained relatively undefined. The 2025 Global Governance Initiative put forward by President Xi, although not mentioned in the Tianjin Declaration – the SCO Summit official outcome – was apparently endorsed by all SCO members and represents a much more systematic and comprehensive approach to global governance reform. It explicitly positions China as a global leader “ready to work with all countries for a more just and equitable global governance system”.
At its inception in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was a platform for China and Russia to counterbalance the Western influence in Eurasia. Over the last 25 years, the organisation has evolved to mirror how China and Russia see their position in the world. For both Moscow and Beijing, the SCO has become less about institutional machinery and more about projecting a shared narrative of multipolarity and an alternative to the West.
The transformation reflects not just the growth of Chinese economic power – from a developing economy in 1997 to the world’s second-largest economy by 2025 – but also the deepening institutional cooperation between China and Russia across multiple domains. This evolution suggests that the China-Russia partnership has successfully transitioned from a reactive alignment against perceived Western dominance to a proactive agenda for alternative global governance, with implications that extend far beyond their bilateral relationship to encompass the broader international system.
Achievements and reality
The SCO claims to have enabled cooperation amongst members across broad themes of security, economic alignment, cultural promotion, and crisis response. Primarily funded by member states’ contributions, some of its biggest achievements include counterterrorism initiatives, joint drills of armed forces, intelligence sharing, and numerous declarations on trade, infrastructure and energy. Moreover, initiatives such as university partnerships, youth festivals, heritage promotion across the ancient silk road , have been promoted for the cultural integration of the bloc.
The joint security activities have deepened regional trust and operational readiness: the SCO established the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in 2004, coordinating responses to the disruption of financing networks and sharing threat analyses; since 2016, member states exchange real-time terrorism and separatism intelligence under signed protocols; annual “Peace Mission” counterterror drills—most recently in Kazakhstan in 2024—have tested rapid deployment, special-forces tactics, and interoperable command systems; a 2023 SCO naval exercise in the Arabian Sea practiced combined patrols, anti-piracy operations, and joint search-and-rescue missions; and Central Asian cross-border security working groups now conduct joint patrols and operate shared surveillance along smuggling routes.
Over the last four summits—Samarkand (2022), New Delhi (2023), Astana (2024), and Tianjin (2025)—the SCO has steadily broadened its agenda while sharpening its political tone. This year’s summit resulted in 24 outcome documents. Nonetheless, strong coordination amongst member states still remains elusive. The broadened agenda has increased diversity of documents signed but has hardly impacted the lives and livelihoods of the respective peoples. And as is more often than not the case in international affairs, in this and other regions, hypocrisy and double standards abound. Whilst the SCO members sign declarations about International Rule of Law and Sovereign Equality, Russia has illegally invaded Ukraine, and China is a regional bully—embroiled in disputes with nearly all of its neighbors (except Russia). Moreover, India and Pakistan, both SCO members, are perennial adversaries and even fought a brief war earlier this year. For all talk of improving trade, China routinely imposes tariffs and coercive restrictions on its neighbours, turning economic cooperation into an instrument of dominance rather than integration. There is no SCO free trade zone, no operational development bank (one is proposed) and no customs integration.
External pressures as accelerants of integration
External tariff shocks from the United States reinforce Beijing–Moscow advocacy for “multipolar” economic governance, making narrative alignment among SCO members easier even if institutional depth lags. For China, Russia and lately India too, the SCO now serves clearer short‑term purposes.
India, the second largest economy of the bloc, had long downplayed the SCO since joining in 2017. This year has been different, though: Official readouts from India-China bilateral meetings highlighted managing the border peacefully and improving connectivity. The Indian government started issuing visas to Chinese nationals, which were severely restricted since the Indo-China clashes in Galwan in 2020. Further, the Indian government ordered airlines to start direct flights between the two countries, which were suspended for the past five years.
Russia, cut off from the West due to sanctions, pushed for reviving the old Russia-India-China (RIC) trio. For Moscow, India and China remain its lifelines, as they buy Russian oil when few others will. Russia sees the trio as a way to trade more despite sanctions, and to keep insurance, shipping, and overland routes open through Eurasia. The idea is to show that partners can still coordinate on energy, payments, and transport—even if the SCO institutions are not yet strong enough to deliver deep economic integration.
China, meanwhile, pitches the SCO as a platform for deeper regional integration. Discussions in Tianjin covered cooperation in trade, payments, and digital platforms. Among the ideas floated was greater use of local currencies—the rupee, ruble, and renminbi—for settling payments, as part of a broader effort to reduce dollar dependence. These ideas remain at an early stage, though, and may advance faster through BRICS+ mechanisms, which already emphasize financing and payments tools.
SCO vs BRICS+: competing models of cooperation
As noted earlier, SCO economic integration remains weak, whereas China, Russia, India and now Iran are also members of the BRICS+, which began primarily as an economic coordination platform.Key differences between the two international groups are their focus areas and membership composition. While the SCO has focused on regional security and political narrative-making, it has always done so under the China-Russia shadow. BRICS, in contrast, has been more of a coming together of equals and has focused on reform of the IMF, the World Bank and the UN system; trade and digital cooperation; and alternative finance (New Development Bank, Contingent Reserve Arrangements). The membership composition of the SCO is largely regional to Central Asia, whereas BRICS+ covers a larger geography and is a more accurate representation of the Global South.
Ultimately, the SCO functions more as a geopolitical narrative platform—useful to China and Russia for multipolarity, and tolerated by India and Central Asia for lack of better options. SCO is overshadowed by BRICS+ in delivering tangible global governance alternatives. If SCO is to function as a proper regional body, covering the central part of Asia and part of East Asia from the continent’s North to the South, then concrete steps need to be taken towards democratic governance arrangements, a setup of joint financing institutions, and/or a customs union. Such measures would move the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation beyond declarations, and give it more legitimacy.
Manan Shah, based in Ahmedabad, India, currently serves as Operations Lead at FOGGS – Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability. His role centers on research, IT systems, social media outreach, and analysis of governance and global sustainability issues. Manan is passionate about community outreach, climate action, and promoting the Sustainable Development Goals, and continues to engage in projects that bridge technology, advocacy, and positive social change.
