How the nuclear issue has been manipulated for geopolitical objectives
In 1968, Iran signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which seeks to prevent the proliferation of atomic weapons, advance atomic disarmament, and address the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the safeguards regime of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Within this framework, Iran has several nuclear facilities, the main ones being the German- and Russian-designed Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which houses the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), among other facilities; the Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment facilities; and the Khondab IR-40 heavy water reactor.
These last three facilities could have military applications if they were to produce high percentages of Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239. Indeed, if the enrichment of the Uranium-235 isotope produced at Natanz or Fordow reaches 90%, uranium suitable for atomic weapons would be available. In contrast, less than 4% enrichment is sufficient as nuclear fuel in Bushehr for electricity generation and desalination, while the TRR reactor can produce radioisotopes for medicine and industry with 20% enrichment. This explains the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the dual use of the enrichment plants: civilian ones up to 20% and military ones above 90%. Furthermore, if Plutonium-239 production at Khondab IR-40 reaches 93%, plutonium suitable for atomic weapons would also be available.
Ambiguity on the dual use of Iranian enrichment plants
Due to the economic impact of international sanctions and the rising pressure of a young and educated society in need of economic development, the reformist President Rouhani, elected in 2013, initiated negotiations with the international community regarding Iran’s atomic programme as a means of ensuring the continuity of the Iranian regime. Negotiations with the five nuclear powers of the UN Security Council, plus the European Union (EU) and Germany, culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in July 2015 between Iran and the seven partners. It reversed Iran’s military programme towards the development of nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of the various economic sanctions imposed on Iran.
Indeed, the JCPOA agreement limited inventories and capacities for enriching Uranium-235 and producing Plutonium-239. In particular, the main JCPOA measures stipulated a reduction by two-thirds in the number of centrifuges used at Natanz; a limit on enrichment at Natanz to 3.67%; the conversion of Fordow into a nuclear physics and technology research centre without production of nuclear material; cutting the Iranian stockpile to 300 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched to up to 3.67%; the use of the Iranian stockpile of medium-enriched (5-20%) uranium for fabrication of nuclear fuel for the TRR reactor; a redesign of Khondab IR-40, with uranium fuel enriched up to 3.67%, for research activities and radioisotope production for medical and industrial uses; no engagement in fuel reprocessing; and making available the excess heavy water for export to international markets. In that way, the JCPOA aimed to prevent the military use of the Iranian nuclear programme and was widely considered a success of international diplomacy, despite the opposition expressed by Israel, alluding to the exclusion of missiles from that atomic agreement, and by Saudi Arabia.
However, Iran’s main interest in avoiding economic sanctions to alleviate social unrest clashed head-on with Israel’s primary objective of preventing the JCPOA from consolidating the Iranian regime by lifting sanctions. In this context, President Trump – persuaded by Prime Minister Netanyahu and opposed to Obama’s legacy – withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018, even though Iran was complying with it, as confirmed by IAEA supervision. Trump also reinstated economic sanctions against Iran and penalised foreign companies that maintained business dealings with Iran. This caused consternation among the agreement’s partners and drew criticism from the EU and the three European signatories[1]. This fiasco, along with the 2020 elimination of the Iranian commander-in-chief Soleimani, was considered to have increased public support in the polls for possessing nuclear weapons[2] and benefited the radical Raisi, who, in the 2021 presidential elections, which he won, accused outgoing President Rouhani of treason for the JCPOA agreement. Subsequently, there were diplomatic attempts to revive the agreement, primarily promoted by President Biden and EU High Representative Borrell, but Iranian support for Russia in the war in Ukraine tainted negotiations with the Western signatories. There were still unsuccessful attempts in 2024 by Russia, China and Iran to reactivate the agreement. In the end, the grand opportunity to halt Iran’s atomic weapons programme vanished.
Clash between Iran’s main objective of lifting economic sanctions and Israel’s purpose of preventing the consolidation of the Iranian regime
Following the reciprocal missile attacks between Israel and Iran in April 2024, and after the death of President Raisi in a helicopter crash[3], the reformist Pezeshkian won the presidential elections in July 2024 and announced his intention to negotiate with the US. Since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has increased the number of centrifuges and has had enough time to reach the 90% enrichment of Uranium-235 necessary to manufacture atomic weapons. According to the IAEA, Iran had meanwhile continued enrichment, by June 2025 producing approximately 400 kg of Uranium-235 enriched to 60%, thereby maintaining its state of “nuclear latency” – in other words, possessing the necessary infrastructure, knowledge, and materials to develop atomic weapons, should it decide to proceed. In this regard, the ‘fatwa’ declared in 2010 by Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, which stated that the production of atomic weapons violates Islamic principles, may be subject to different interpretations. The gradual enrichment towards the aforementioned 90% was perceived as a bargaining chip to achieve the lifting of economic sanctions, Iran’s main objective, as a means to guarantee the survival of the regime.
With escalating tensions between Israel and Iran and the return to power of President Trump in 2025, the US demanded the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran eventually proposed establishing a regional consortium for joint uranium enrichment with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the latter of which had four nuclear reactors in operation. These negotiations ended abruptly in June 2025, following two phases of Israeli and US bombing raids on the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants, the Isfahan nuclear centre, and the Khondab IR-40 heavy water reactor. The true extent of the damage is unknown, as Iran did not allow the IAEA access to the targeted facilities.
During recent negotiations, the mediator Oman reported that Iran was ready to halt uranium enrichment but not missile development in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions, when Israel and the US attacked Iran on February 28. A war spread across several countries in the Middle East, causing thousands of casualties, displacing more than one million people, and affecting vital infrastructure. The war is escalating, and the short-term future is highly uncertain. Humanitarian, energy, and economic impacts are affecting many countries, with the risk of escalation toward unpredictable and extremely critical scenarios.
The nuclear impact of the war could be dramatic
Various accounts of the current war in the Middle East suggest that some of the Iranian nuclear facilities mentioned have been attacked again, as have areas near the Israeli Dimona nuclear site and the Iranian Bushehr site, the latter of which has been attacked four times. The extent of the damage remains unknown, but the potential nuclear impact of the war could be far more dramatic, given the enormous military capabilities of the combatants. Iran possesses hypersonic missiles that are difficult to defend against, while Israel – a non-signatory to the NPT – has a military doctrine, the “Samson Option”, that envisions nuclear strikes as a last resort against an existential threat.
Iran may withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and produce nuclear weapons
Current reports indicate negotiations between the US and Iran to freeze Iran’s uranium enrichment for varying periods. These conditions are far less stringent than the measures agreed under the JCPOA signed in 2015. Since the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran may already have reached 90% enrichment, making uranium suitable for atomic weapons, though its primary objective has been the lifting of economic sanctions. The Iranian nuclear programme has been used as a pretext for geopolitical and energy strategies aimed at regional hegemony and regime change in Tehran. It is false that Iran can produce atomic weapons in the short term, but depending on how this war ends, Iran may decide to withdraw from the NPT to produce nuclear weapons, as North Korea did in 2003.
Dr Alejandro Zurita is a nuclear engineer at UPC Barcelona and holds a PhD from TU Hannover. He served as Head of International Nuclear Research Cooperation (fusion and fission) at the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) from 2008 to 2016, and later as Minister-Counsellor for Science, Technology, and Innovation for the European Union in Brazil and CELAC from 2016 to 2020.
