The Queen has announced it: there will be a referendum on the UK´s EU membership no later than 2017. There is no way back. The question the British voters will be called upon to answer according to Downing Street is crystal clear: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?” It reflects the best British tradition of boldness and un-ambiguity – features that are certainly absent from the European integration process, built on grand pronouncements, half-baked solutions and lack of clarity for the citizen.
In the UK case, at least, it would appear that the process that we have in front of us is straightforward. Or, is it?
Mr. Cameron has embarked on wide consultations with European partners in an attempt to secure a number of reforms of the EU prior to the referendum. If he succeeds in his undertaking he will campaign in favour of the UK’s staying in the Union. If he fails, he has indicated he may campaign against.
Leaving aside the content of potential reforms, from the process point of view we are faced with two compounded sets of two unknown variables each: Will there be EU reform? Yes / No. Will Brits vote to stay in? Yes / No. Thus, by the end of 2017, we will find ourselves in one of the following scenarios:
1. a reformed EU with the UK
2. a reformed EU without the UK
3. a non-reformed EU with the UK
4. a non-reformed EU without the UK
From these four end-states we can now walk backwards to see some of the traps present in this otherwise apparently simple process.
Scenario 1 may seem the best. Brits would be happy in an EU that has been reformed to their liking. But what would the other countries say? We reformed the Union to please one electorate. Other electorates may demand similar treatment. All member states, not least some of the newcomers in the East, who face existential hesitation with respect to their membership, may want to reform the Union to their taste, just as the UK did. It would be difficult for the leaders of these countries to tell their respective people that a major reform effort has been implemented to please the Brits but that no reform will be undertaken to please them. The reform, consequently, will have to be broad enough to address major grievances by other countries too, not only the UK. Not an easy task.
The reform, consequently, will have to be broad enough to address major grievances by other countries too, not only the UK. Not an easy task.
Scenario 2 appears as the most absurd. We reformed the Union to please the Brits for them to eventually leave it anyway. All participating leaders will appear equally as fools. There are some ways of preventing this, though. Some kind of conditionality can be built in: reforms are to apply only if the UK stays. Or, perhaps, (re)introduce British exceptionalism: some of the reforms may be applicable only to the UK if it stays. But then, others will say “me too”. Most likely, anyway, EU leaders will present any reforms they agree to as desirable to all. They will say that they were needed not only to please the UK but also to improve the functioning of the Union as a whole, regardless of the UK staying or not. The timing of the eventual reform versus the date of the referendum is, in any case, crucial. And beware of the Scots, how they may react to a UK withdrawal from the EU, especially if the EU has been accommodating to UK demands.
EU leaders will present any reforms they agree to as desirable to all. They will say that they were needed not only to please the UK but also to improve the functioning of the Union as a whole, regardless of the UK staying or not.
Scenario 3 seems unlikely, given Cameron´s current line. But Cameron may not be the only influential player in the run-up to the referendum. What about a powerful coalition of pro-EU forces across the UK, including opposition parties, NGOs, labour unions and industry, along with the pro-EU Scots? And what of a last-minute mobilisation across the continent, of millions of European voices crying out loud at their fellow Brits, over the head of the British prime minister, “We want you”. Is it impossible for such a coalition to carry the day, instead of the Prime Minister? Maybe yes, and maybe somebody should resign the day after, opening the way for a new general election in the UK within the EU.
Scenario 4 will be one of initial frustration for many. Europe is not complete without the UK, which is not only a major driving force of the EU´s economy but an indispensable component of its personality too. Its history, its culture, its language, its contribution to science and human progress constitute an important part of the European ethos. The cold shower of such a result would be compounded by the ensuing procedural nightmare, as no country has ever left the Union and it is not clear how the “disintegration” or rather “disengagement” or divorce should be implemented. On the positive side, if there is a positive side to this scenario, the Union will be freed of the recurrent British opposition to further deepening integration.
Europe is not complete without the UK, which is not only a major driving force of the EU´s economy but an indispensable component of its personality too.
We would like to hope that a best-case scenario 1 will see the light of day. The Union needs a shake-up, its processes and its focus apparently having lost their way. Why not take advantage of a(nother) good crisis, a constitutional one this time, to rethink the balances between the European institutions and the member states, between the national and the continental? It might then become clear that the UK is not so much alone when it advocates the partial disengagement of “Brussels” from the small, daily things that citizens can settle at the national or even local level. In this optimistic scenario, even the UK might see the value of more centrally coordinated action on the big challenges of security, sustainable development and justice that confront Europe and the world.
