As the drama unfolds and takes unanticipated turns, that appear to be approaching a final dénouement, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the bona fide middle class, non-expert, European observers to form an opinion as to whose side they’re on in the Greek crisis.
As it stands now, there are two clear camps: an important segment of the Greek population against the rest of the countries of the Eurozone, each side represented by their respective governments. And the difference in the quality of the representation is important. While the Greek government was elected precisely because of its views on the very issues at stake (and, therefore, these views are likely to represent the preferences of its citizens), the rest of the Eurozone’s governments were certainly not elected specifically because of their views concerning Greece’s situation. Thus, it is not clear whether they do or do not represent the majoritarian preferences of their peoples on this specific issue. This is an unavoidable imperfection of democratic representation, but it is an important one in this case, as the story may end up with an unsavoury conclusion for the majority of Europeans.
While the Greek government was elected precisely because of its views on the very issues at stake, the rest of the Eurozone´s governments were certainly not elected specifically because of their views concerning Greece´s situation.
As negotiations broke down, Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem explained the Eurogroup’s standing: Greece had unilaterally left the negotiating table and announced the holding of a referendum; therefore, the Eurogroup had nothing else to do except apply what had previously been agreed upon and brace themselves for the consequences. What had previously been agreed upon was the non-prolongation of the bailout programme unless a new agreement with Greece had been signed. What Dijsselbloem failed to explain is why the Eurogroup chose not to extend the current programme for one more week, to give Greece enough time to hold the referendum. It was a matter of just one week. The financial impact would have been minimal, in comparison to what may lie ahead.
What Dijsselbloem failed to explain is why the Eurogroup chose not to extend the current programme for one more week, to give Greece enough time to hold the referendum.
To its credit, the Tsipras government understood that the Eurogroup’s offer was not consistent with its mandate democratically chosen by the Greek citizens and, therefore, decided to consult the people before proceeding with negotiations. They asked for a one-week extension of the ongoing programme to avoid defaulting on imminent payments and triggering potential financial chaos. It sounds reasonable, though there are many caveats in this reasoning.
While calling upon the people to express themselves on such a crucial issue seems, in principle, a very democratic thing to do, there is something very questionable about it. It grants asymmetric legitimacy to those voices participating in the Eurogroup negotiations. The Greek position, backed by a referendum, cannot be changed as it is the direct expression of the will of the people. It is, therefore, to be unequivocally accepted by the other 18 countries. The only way to re-establish symmetry would be to organise referenda in each and every euro area member state in an unprecedented exercise of direct people-to-people bargaining. This is obviously not feasible.
The issue is certainly not equally important to both the Greek population and the rest of the Eurozone citizens. Or is it? If the rest of the European citizens were called to vote on whether or not to accept a certain level of exceptionalism with regard to the Greek debt (this is accepting re-negotiation, including write offs and extensions) in exchange for avoiding a major setback to the European construction process and, en passant, sparing Greek retirees of a miserable end to their lives, the result could be surprising. The holding of such a consultation is an unthinkable prospect, but the Europgroup should keep in mind that they also represent their own constituencies and that their people may, in fact, be more sympathetic to the plight of regular Greek citizens and not necessarily to that of their own governments.
In any case, the frustration of some Eurogroup members is understandable, as they would—perhaps will—be faced with a negotiating position backed by a referendum. It is not the same to say no to a government of a small country in a dire economic situation, than to say no to the people of that same country.
Meanwhile, despite all the misleading opinions voiced, the Tsipras government never said that it did not intend to pay back its debts. It said it wanted to pay them back in a way that would limit social costs and would not strangle the Greek economy. Here, the debate becomes technical as IMF Executive Director Christine Lagarde has vocalised more or less the same stance in terms of the second condition of the proposition (but proposing different measures for the same end), while not being very outspoken on the question of social costs. Here is where the average middle class European citizen gets lost as he/she cannot properly assess the contradictory arguments, thus, forced to rely on intuition alone.
Despite everything said by experts and opinion makers since the break up of the negotiations, the Tsipras government seems to believe that there will be a resumption of the talks once the referendum is held.
Neither did the Tsipras government say that it intended for Greece to leave the Eurozone. Despite everything said by experts and opinion makers since the break up of the negotiations, they seem to believe that there will be a resumption of the talks once the referendum is held. To their credit, the rest of the Eurozone members have also said that the door remains open and that it was never their intention for such an abrupt end to the negotiations. Moreover, they have all added that they wish to see Greece stay in the Euro. At this moment, it is difficult to imagine how but the option of reconciliation remains. This is probably what most European citizens, who have difficulty making up their minds as to who is right and who is wrong, want.
The editorial team of Katoikos
