Countries producing critical minerals should use the growing demand for their resources to attract investment and expand their economies. Their minerals are needed for the energy transition, advanced manufacturing and defence. This creates opportunities for employment and industrial development that governments have good reason to pursue.
However, securing a buyer is not the same as securing development. An agreement can provide reliable supplies to one country and export earnings to another without substantially changing the productive capacity of the supplying economy. Both parties may benefit, but the longer-term opportunities they obtain can differ considerably.
That distinction deserves more attention.
It informed a recent dialogue convened by the Global South Perspectives Network in association with T20 U.S. 2026, which examined how producing countries could turn strategic resources into developmental assets. The concern is relevant across the Global South, where mineral wealth has not consistently been accompanied by diversified economies or sufficient employment.
The present competition for resources may improve the position of producers. Major economies want dependable supplies and are concerned about their reliance on processing and refining undertaken elsewhere. Countries able to meet their needs have something valuable to negotiate with.
But what should they seek in return?
Additional exports matter, particularly where governments need revenue and foreign exchange. There is also a case for negotiating investment that supports further processing and creates opportunities for local businesses. The question is whether a proposed agreement helps establish activities that can be sustained and developed over time.
This requires more work than announcing a commitment to beneficiation.
Processing minerals locally may retain greater value, but the facility must have dependable electricity at a competitive price. It needs transport, technical expertise and finance. If these conditions are absent, requiring local processing will not necessarily bring it into existence. An export restriction may instead reduce production or direct investment elsewhere.
Governments should therefore assess what particular activities require before deciding how to encourage them. Different minerals involve different processes and costs and even deposits of the same mineral may present different technical challenges. Therefore, a policy suitable for one industry or location cannot simply be transferred to another because both involve mining.
There is a responsibility on investors too, in that producing countries are entitled to ask whether an agreement can support greater economic participation than extraction alone. Accordingly, commercial viability deserves serious consideration, but so does the development ambition of the country supplying the resource.
The negotiation should examine both.
Cooperation between producing countries could help. Governments pursuing similar objectives may weaken their position if they compete for the same investors by accepting fewer obligations. Where comparable resources are available elsewhere, one country’s insistence on local investment may be undermined by another’s willingness to proceed without it.
This does not mean that all producers should adopt identical policies. Their capabilities differ, and those differences may provide the basis for useful partnerships. One country may possess the deposits while another has suitable processing facilities or expertise. An external partner could contribute technology and capital.
Such arrangements need a fair distribution of benefits. A country supplying minerals must receive a worthwhile return even where processing takes place across its border. Otherwise, cooperation risks reproducing the imbalance it was intended to address.
Nor should the market always be assumed to lie elsewhere. Opportunities to manufacture for consumers and industries within the Global South warrant examination alongside exports to established markets. Their commercial prospects must be tested. They should at least form part of the development strategy.
The terms of supply agreements also require scrutiny. An exclusive arrangement may help secure finance, but restrictions extending over many years can affect a country’s ability to pursue other opportunities. A dependable buyer today may not offer the best terms throughout the life of a project.
What happens if another buyer offers more? Can alternative investors participate? How much freedom remains to develop new industrial relationships?
These questions concern future economic choices. Governments need access to reliable geological information, market knowledge and specialist legal advice when assessing them. Sharing expertise and contractual experience would help countries avoid negotiating complex agreements without adequate support. This can begin between willing partners without waiting for a comprehensive international settlement.
Producers must also consider changes in demand. Mining and processing require long commitments, while technologies can change within that period. The development of alternative battery materials illustrates why present strategic importance cannot be treated as a guarantee of future demand.
It would be unwise to build an entire development strategy around that assumption.
Domestic governance remains equally important. A well-negotiated agreement achieves little if public institutions cannot enforce its provisions or if revenues sustain patronage rather than public benefit. Producing countries need capable institutions as much as they need stronger bargaining positions.
Communities require their own place in these arrangements. Government, industry and civil society participation does not automatically give affected people an effective voice. They should be able to influence decisions and obtain recourse where commitments are not fulfilled.
Further processing also brings environmental responsibilities. Its economic contribution should be assessed together with the costs it creates and the arrangements for meeting them. Otherwise, communities and taxpayers may inherit liabilities that reduce the benefit of the investment.
The G20 and United Nations could support practical cooperation on information, negotiating capacity and the space required for industrial development. Producing countries should have a meaningful role in shaping these arrangements, since security of supply and development deserve consideration together.
The Global South should pursue mineral partnerships actively and deal with prospective investors on their merits. It must also undertake the domestic work necessary to make projects succeed.
The test is what remains in the producing economy over time. Investment should build businesses and capabilities that support further opportunities, while improving the lives of affected people. That is a reasonable return to seek from resources considered essential to the development and security of others.