By Yanni Gigourtsis
A few hours separate us from perhaps the most critical elections in Turkey since the establishment of the multiparty parliamentary system in the late 1940s.
Once again, as in the last 15 years, the protagonist in this year’s election–as it should not, at first reading – is the country’s President and, for many years, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In the 7 June elections, however, the stakes are higher for the political future of the Turkish President. It is the future of the country and the course it will take in the coming decades that will be decided. Let me explain.
Mr. Erdoğan appeared on the political scene in 1994, as a successful mayor of Istanbul. He has since risen continuously in the country’s political life and has reached the highest office in Turkey. In 2001 he founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP), along with others mainly coming from political Islam and Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party. He became the leader of the AKP with the support of more experienced members, like Abdullah Gul, because of his charismatic rapport with the people. The party won the elections a year later and has been governing Turkey without interruption since. It has managed to raise its percentage of the vote from one election to the next and to overcome all obstacles initially put in its way by the old Kemalist establishment.
Mr. Erdoğan’s party was able to win the majority of the Turkish public’s support and votes by introducing a series of liberal societal and economic reforms that led the country out of crisis and on the path towards economic growth.
Mr. Erdoğan’s party was able to win the majority of the Turkish public’s support and votes by introducing a series of liberal societal and economic reforms that led the country out of crisis and on the path towards economic growth. It also brought large parts of the Turkish population, which were until then marginalised, to the fore of the social and political scene. Religious freedoms have been the flagship of Mr. Erdoğan’s liberal reforms and have also benefited the country’s non-Muslim communities. The free use of the veil in public by women who so wish became the symbol of the struggle against the previous status quo and of the promotion of what became known as political (or democratic) Islam.
This ideology, which tries to combine the Western values of freedom and democracy with those of Islam, was particularly loved and promoted also by the Western world. The US especially saw an opportunity to create a political model of governance that could also be transposed to neighbouring Muslim territories controlled by the mostly militaristic Arab regimes. A theoretician and promoter of this political line, which also implied getting closer to the European Union, was Fethullah Gülen, a religious leader in exile in the US and, until recently, a close ally of Mr. Erdoğan. Gülen cultivated and promoted the ideology of liberal democratic Islam through an extensive worldwide network of schools, charities and businesses.
The US especially saw an opportunity to create a political model of governance that could also be transposed to neighbouring Muslim territories controlled by the mostly militaristic Arab regimes.
Similarly, important steps have been made in recent years with regard to Turkey’s biggest internal problem, the Kurdish issue. Concessions made on behalf of the Turkish government to the country’s Kurds attracted many Kurdish voters to the ruling party. At the same time, the talks started with Kurdish political organisations – including, indirectly, the illegal Kurdish party PKK – in a process called “Peace March,” which aims at arriving to a sustainable solution to the Kurdish issue.
Things, however, began to change in recent years by heading in a direction that challenges some of the government’s choices. This brought on a defensive attitude and gradually led the government to authoritarianism and the cancellation of many of the liberal reforms that it had introduced in terms of freedom of speech and expression. Things became much stricter over the last two years after the events that took place in Istanbul, and in many other Turkish cities, following demonstrations against the reconstruction of the park at Taksim Square, at the very centre of Istanbul.
Dozens of journalists thus found themselves in prison or under prosecution, and hundreds of ordinary citizens were arrested and charged with criminal activity in relation to those events and other demonstrations. At the same time, in late 2013, a conflict erupted between Mr. Erdoğan and his former loyal ally, Fethullah Gülen. This was caused by the revelation of some corruption scandals that involved the government and then-Prime Minister Erdoğan’s family. A relentless war has since been launched against what Mr. Erdoğan calls a “parallel state.” This has resulted in widespread purges in the police and the judiciary, but also a witch hunt against any entity (press conglomerates, banks, private schools) or individual that the government considers part of the “parallel” structures it wishes to dismantle.
Things became much stricter over the last two years after the events that took place in Istanbul, and in many other Turkish cities, following demonstrations against the reconstruction of the park at Taksim Square, at the very centre of Istanbul.
Additionally, the economy is showing significant signs of fatigue and deceleration. Unemployment is gradually rising and talks on the Kurdish issue do not seem to be progressing satisfactorily and have lately stalled. The Turkish President, who likes to portray himself and his party as victims suffering persecution, claims that all problems in the country emanate from the parallel state, from various interest lobbies (publishing, banking, etc.) and foreign agents (outside powers and foreign media) that envy Turkey and want to impede its ascension towards becoming a developed and powerful country with a broader role in the region, as the Turkish President himself and Prime Minister Davutoğlu envision.
Last August, Mr. Erdoğan was elected Turkey’s president with 52% of the vote. Since then, he has exercised his duties dynamically, taking an active role in political life and becoming directly involved in government matters. This de facto involvement in everyday politics which, according to his opponents, goes beyond the limits imposed by the Constitution of the country, Mr. Erdoğan wants to make a de jure arrangement. The aim now is to abolish the parliamentary system and introduce a strong presidential system of government, which will essentially concentrate all the country’s powers in Mr. Erdoğan’s hands, making him the absolute and dominant figure for at least the next decade.
HDP is led by Selahettin Demirtaş, a young, mild-tempered and charismatic politician with great personal popularity and appeal; he the first politician in decades who can compete in popularity with Mr. Erdoğan.
This plan is firmly opposed by all opposition parties, and seemingly even by voters of the ruling party. For this plan to be realised, the ruling Justice and Development Party needs to win another election but with a strong parliamentary majority, so that it can either change the constitution directly or refer the matter to a referendum (depending on the number of seats it will have in Parliament.) The main obstacle in this pursuit, however, is not so much the two major opposition parties (the Republican People’s Party (CHP) of Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu and the National People’s Party (MHP) of Mr. Brachtseli both with Kemalist roots) but the third one, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), which is an evolution of the older Kurdish party DBP. Changing the rhetoric and objectives of the previous pro-Kurdish parties, this party that is structurally left-leaning and was founded two years ago has managed to influence broader segments of the electorate and has gained popularity both in the fragmented Turkish left as well as, very importantly, among wider groups of bourgeois liberals, intellectuals, businessmen and bankers. The aim of the party – which is participating autonomously in the elections for the first time – is to score above the very high threshold of 10% for entering Parliament.
HDP is led by Selahettin Demirtaş, a young, mild-tempered and charismatic politician with great personal popularity and appeal; he is the first politician in decades who can compete in popularity with Mr. Erdoğan. Given the numbers of seats that HDP will win if it passes the threshold, and following its explicit and clear commitment that it will in no way support President Erdoğan’s presidential dream, the stakes of this election are quite high.
The electoral battle is once again a personal battle for Mr. Erdoğan.
All opposition forces are fighting to limit the victory of the ruling party and put an end to Mr. Erdoğan’s ambition of becoming, as they claim, an elected dictator. The Turkish President himself, on the other hand, has not left things to chance and has participated actively (despite the constitutional prohibition) in the electoral campaign of the government, inventing various excuses for his participation in electoral speeches.
Things appear difficult for the first time in Mr. Erdoğan’s twenty-plus years of triumphant march. The latest polls show the ruling party losing considerable numbers of votes to the opposition as a whole and – primarily – to the HDP, which seems on course to easily pass the 10% threshold. The electoral battle is once again a personal battle for Mr. Erdoğan. And this time, for the first time, it looks like this may be a battle that he will not win. Of course, quoting an old Greek politician, Constantine Karamanlis: “the ballot box is like a pregnant woman. Until the time when the child comes into the world one cannot know how it will be.”
The opposition, meanwhile, has organized a vast network of polling agents to monitor the results, in light of fears and suspicions of fraud attempts. Mr. Demirtaş, of the HDP, has instructed all polling agents of his party to remain in the polling stations until the official announcement of the results. “Do not go out to celebrate if we win. The celebrations will not be on 7 June but on the following day, 8 June,” he said.
Whatever decision will be made, it will affect not only the lives of the citizens of Turkey but also the geostrategic role of the country, thus in the medium term affecting the entire region, especially the Middle East.
On 7 June, Turkey will hit a fork in the road and will have to decide which path to take. The first and last word for this decision naturally belongs to the Turkish people. But whatever decision will be made, it will affect not only the lives of the citizens of Turkey but also the geostrategic role of the country, thus in the medium term affecting the entire region, especially the Middle East.
Regarding the great protagonist of the election evening, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 7 June will be the day that will mark an end and a new beginning. The question is whether this will be the beginning of the Almighty Mr. Erdoğan, as the sole and undisputed leader of the new Turkey that he envisions, or the beginning of the end of his thus-far total domination of the political game in his country. Whatever the outcome of the elections, it is certain that it will mark the beginning of political developments with an impact that will last for years, perhaps even decades, affecting Turkey and its wider neighbourhood.
The editorial team of Katoikos
