Overlapping existential questions to start with
The war in Ukraine is first and foremost a response to what Russia considers as existential threat, in the face of NATO’s continued expansion on its borders. The so-called “denazification” of Ukraine remains a smokescreen with no real substance intended to justify the special military operation against its neighbour, to undo the damage done, see ‘westernisation’ culturally and politically and close cooperation with NATO and the EU.
For Ukraine, on the other hand, the Russian invasion was experienced as a double aggression: aggression against the desire of the vast majority of its population to get closer to the Western world (and to integrate into the European Union for this purpose) and aggression against its desire to defend a territory resulting from the partition of the former USSR and universally recognized as sovereign by the international community (even if it meant ignoring the autonomist aspirations of part of its Russian-speaking population).
Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression has proven to be exceptional, helped it is true by the so-called “Western” countries. The latter have so far mobilized 267 billion euros for military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, including 135 billion by the European Union and its Member States and 114 billion by the United States) nor have they spared sanctions of all kinds, in ascending order, against Russia – economic, trade, financial and technological sanctions in particular.
Where do we stand now?
Three years after the beginning of this war in the heart of Europe, no decisive offensive has been able to prevail on either side, at the disastrous cost of one and a half million dead and wounded on the battlefields, according to the most recent estimates. At the same time, Western support to Ukraine has turned into an existential test – and hopefully a push forward – for European security and defence and has put to the test the already waning American interest and commitment to its allies and/or to anything beyond the US’s own borders.
The conditions for a return to peace
At this stage, the question arises as to whether it is conceivable and possible to bring peace to Europe and to build promising cooperation between all the parties present on the European continent, which presupposes in my view three conditions:
- That a viable and lasting peace process can be initiated and concluded between Russia and Ukraine;
- That Europeans no longer depend on the United States to ensure their own defence; and
- That cooperation be resumed between Russia and the European Union on a sound and lasting basis.
The first and most urgent condition is fundamental to bringing peace and security to Europe, at a time when global geopolitical developments have rendered this necessary. However, no viable agreement will be conceivable if the parties stick to their demands and refuse to compromise.
For Russia, from my point of view, this would consist in recognising Ukraine’s sovereign right to enter the European Union, without restrictions of any kind, including in terms of its defence (access, in particular, to the mutual defence clause of Article 42, paragraph 7, of the Treaty on European Union). This would also consist in a formal Russian commitment not to intervene in Ukraine in any form whatsoever – military, political or any other. Finally, it would consist in recognising the right of the Donbass populations to decide their own fate sovereignly: belonging to Ukraine for some or joining Russia for others, according to the wishes expressed in the form of referendums, supervised by the UN with the support of the OSCE, in the four oblasts of the Donbass. In addition, reparations due to Ukraine would be demanded from Russia to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and compensate war victims. Such reparations would beguaranteed by the seizure of Russian assets frozen following the invasion of Ukraine.
As far as Ukraine is concerned, the compromises would first consist in a definitive renunciation of the country’s entering NATO, committing instead to a status of neutrality, like Austria for example, without prejudice to the common defence clause of the Treaty of the European Union. They would also consist in the recognition of a definitive annexation of Crimea to Russia, something non-negotiable, in all probability, for Russia. The same would probably be true of the recognition of the two Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, which are attached to Russia, subject to a ratification referendum by the populations concerned in the two autonomous republics. Finally, they could consist – more for the gallery than in substance – in a commitment for Ukraine to ban any far-right organisation in the future, a commitment of a constitutional nature, as in the case of Germany.
For any such agreement to come to life, however, the central role of the European Union – as a key stakeholder to the conflict, both materially and politically – cannot be underestimated. For this very reason, it is imperative that EU capitals renew dialogue with Moscow based on a common position in the face of Putin, even if the latter persists in turning a deaf ear to their calls. After all, sooner or later, Russia will have to realise that nothing can be settled without the help of Western Europe.
Two realisations
Overall, a sustainable peace between Ukraine and Russia hinges on mutual compromises that respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and security concerns, while addressing Russia’s demands for recognition of geopolitical and territorial realities. Ultimately, renewed and unified EU engagement with Russia will be essential to secure lasting stability and cooperation across the continent.
This article draws on the recently published paper by the same author entitled “European Security in the Age of Trump and Putin”, a Peace Reflection Paper, FOGGS Papers, June 2025. The full paper can be accessed here.
